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ABSTRACT
This article examines policy switching between Slovenia and the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBH). The idea behind it is 
that national microsimulation models can be used to apply Slovenian 
parameters to the FBH data, as established by the Personal Income 
Tax (PIT) Act and Social Security Contributions (SSC) Act. Accordingly, 
we introduce FBH parameters to Slovenian data. Along these lines, 
we investigate the effects on public finance systems with respect to 
revenues from PIT and SSC, average after-tax income, tax progressivity, 
income inequality, and the redistributive effect in each of these two 
countries, using the other country’s PIT and SSC solutions. This is the 
first fiscal comparison of Slovenia and the FBH, as well as the first 
policy switching analysis of the two countries.
1. Introduction
Slovenia and Bosnia and Herzegovina have been experiencing several tax reforms over the 
past two decades. With the breakup of the former Yugoslavia, Slovenia immediately started a 
reform of Personal Income Tax (PIT), introducing a comprehensive system at the beginning 
of the 1990s, which is still used and currently has four tax brackets and the highest marginal 
tax rate of 41%. On the other hand, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBH), as one 
part of Bosnia and Herzegovina,1 proceeded slower and introduced a reformed PIT with a 
flat 10% rate only in 2009. The system of social security contributions (SSC) in Slovenia has 
been more or less unchanged since 2002, with the employer (16.1%) and employee (22.1%) 
rates of SSC remaining unchanged. In the FBH, the SSC Act that was introduced in the 
1990s is also still in effect, currently with the employer 10.5% rate and employee 31% rate.
Social, political and economic development was almost incomparable between the 
two countries during the last two decades, as it was radically shaped in the FBH by the 
war in the 1990s. Consequently, the current tax systems in both countries are different 
and hardly resemble the common ex-Yugoslavian basis. While Slovenia shaped its tax 
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system towards a highly progressive PIT (Čok, Sambt, Košak, Verbič, & Majcen, 2012; 
Majcen, Verbič, Bayar, & Čok, 2009), the FBH accepted a flat PIT concept. SSC also 
experienced divergent movements: ratio between the employers (10.5%) and employee 
rate (31.0%) in the FBH is more biased towards the employees than in Slovenia (16.1% 
versus 22.1%).
This article relates these two countries through ‘policy switching.’ The idea behind it is 
to apply Slovenian PIT and SSC parameters to FBH data. Accordingly, the FBH parameters 
are applied to Slovenian data. We use national microsimulation models as a tool for this 
task, to examine the effects on PIT and SSC revenues, the distribution of after-tax income 
by decile groups, tax progressivity, and income inequality in each of the two countries, by 
using the other country’s tax parameters. We investigate the effects on tax progressivity and 
income inequality through the Gini coefficient, concentration indices of after-tax income 
and taxes, the Kakwani index, and decomposition of the redistributive effect. This is the first 
policy switching exercise in public finance between Slovenia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The results presented in this article show that the underlying distribution of income 
in one country has an unsustainable effect on the overall results of taxation, when the tax 
system of the other county is applied. Namely, Slovenian PIT parameters bring higher tax 
revenues in both cases (applied on Slovenian and FBH data) than the FBH flat PIT sys-
tem. On the other hand, adapting the Slovenian SSC system parameters results in a lower 
amount of collected SSC in both cases. Our article thus highlights the consequences of these 
developments, which are reflected in the distribution of income and taxes from a specific 
– taxation – point of view, and shows how countries with a once common background can 
become different in a relatively short period of time. However, since the two countries have 
so different tax systems, one could expect that people in one country should react if the tax 
system of the other country is applied. In practice, the results would thus certainly differ 
from those shown in the article and this represents a limitation of our research.
The rest of the article is organised in three sections. Section 2 discusses the PIT and SSC 
systems in Slovenia and the FBH. Section 3 explains the methodology of applying another 
country’s parameters to data, and introduces the Gini coefficient, the Kakwani index, con-
centration indices, and decomposition of the redistributive effect. The key findings of policy 
switching between Slovenia and the FBH are discussed in Section 4. Section 5 concludes 
the article with the main findings.
2. PIT and SSC systems in Slovenia and the FBH
PIT and SSC represent major fiscal sources in both systems. Together, they account for more 
than half of the total taxes in Slovenia and the FBH, as shown in Table 1. However, there is a 
difference between the FBH and Slovenia in the size of PIT relative to SSC. PIT in the FBH 
is proportionally much smaller in relation to SSC, compared with Slovenia. Although the 
populations of Slovenia and the FBH are roughly similar (around 2 million people), Slovenia 
has a much more efficient collection of PIT and SSC, expressed as a share of GDP. Therefore, 
it is obvious that both types of taxes are much lower per capita in the FBH, especially the 
PIT, which reaches only 0.75% of the national average gross annual wage2 (AGAW), while 
in Slovenia this figure is around seven times higher (5.48% of AGAW).
Let us now outline in brief the similarities and the differences in PIT and SSC systems 
between Slovenia and the FBH. Sources of income (income subject to tax) that are taxed 
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through the PIT Acts in both countries are: (1) income from dependent activity (employ-
ment), (2) income from independent activity (self-employment, contractual work and royal-
ties), (3) income from property and property rights, and (4) income from capital. However, 
what is considered income from capital in Slovenia is different from that in the FBH. Income 
from capital in the FBH represents interest on loans and payments based on voluntary life 
and pension insurance. The Slovenian system covers dividends, capital gains, and interest 
on savings accounts. These are exempt through the PIT Act in the FBH.
In addition to the sources of income listed above, Slovenia also taxes pensions, whereas 
the FBH exempts them. However, due to special tax credit for pensions, only a tiny minority 
of pensions in Slovenia is effectively taxed, and the PIT derived from this source is negligible 
(approximately 0.60% of overall PIT). Of course, if pensioners from our samples reveal other 
types of income, they are included in the analysis. Exclusion of pensions influences the size 
of overall income, as in 2011 pensions represented 10.73% of GDP in Slovenia (Pension 
& Disability Insurance Institute of Slovenia, 2015) and 10.20% of GDP in the FBH (Audit 
Office for Public Institutions in the FBH, 2012). Unlike Slovenia, the FBH also taxes some 
other sources of income through the Personal Income Tax Act, such as, for example, income 
from contests and games of chance. In order to enable comparison, income from capital, 
pensions, and income from contests and games of chance are excluded from the analysis. 
We are aware that this represents a limitation of the research, especially the exclusion of 
pensions as a major income source for an important part of the population.
The main parameters of PIT and SSC used in the microsimulation are summarised 
in Table 2. To enable comparison, tax allowances are expressed in terms of the AGAW. 
Parameters refer to 2011. The reason for choosing this year for the analysis lies in data avail-
ability (for calibration of microsimulation models), as well as in the fact that 2011 was the 
year before the temporary ‘anti-crisis’ PIT system changes that were introduced in Slovenia.
2.1. Tax allowances
Both countries have a general allowance for all taxpayers. As opposed to the FBH system, 
Slovenia differentiates three levels of the general tax allowance depending on the level of 
individual taxpayer’s gross income. Taxpayers with higher gross incomes are entitled to 
claim a lower general tax allowance, this being another element of the PIT progressivity. 
Regarding the children tax allowance, the FBH treats the third and each subsequent child the 
same way, whereas Slovenia increases the tax allowance for each subsequent child regardless 
of how many dependent children a taxpayer has. Children with special needs are treated 
Table 1. Revenues in the FBh and slovenia in 2011.
note: aGaW represents the national average gross annual wage.
source: Federation ministry of Finance (2012); Federal institute for Development Programming of the FBh (2012); tax ad-





% total taxes, 
2011 % GDP, 2011 Tax per capita, 2011 (€)
FBH Slo FBH Slo FBH Slo FBH Slo
Pit 0.13 2.05 4.64 15.6 1.64 5.57 57.18 1,002.10
(0.75% aGaW) (5.48% aGaW)
ssc 1.35 5.27 46.69 39.9 16.51 14.28 576.67 2,569.52
(7.53% aGaW) (14.04% aGaW)
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separately in Slovenia only. Both countries prescribe a tax allowance for adult dependent 
family members. However, the FBH treats dependent spouses separately from other adult 
family members and applies different parameters to them.
Table 2. Pit and ssc parameters in slovenia and the FBh in 2011.
a in the current Personal income tax act in the FBh, tax allowances for voluntary supplementary pension insurance premi-
ums and life insurance premiums are eliminated.
b the overall rate of 41.5% (31% + 10.5%) is used for the majority of the self-employed in the FBh.
source: Personal income tax act in the FBh; social security contributions act in the FBh; Personal income tax act in slove-
nia; social security contributions act in slovenia.
Provision Slovenia FBH
Tax allowance (as a share of the AGAW)
General 0.1718 if gross income above 0.6539 0.2403 for all taxpayers
0.2299 if gross income between 
0.5653 and 0.6539
0.3392 if gross income below 0.5653
children 1st 0.1268 1st 0.1202
2nd 0.1378 2nd 0.1682
3rd 0.2299 3rd and each subsequent child 0.2163
4th 0.3219
5th 0.4140 + additional 0.0921 for 
each subsequent child
Dependent spouse same as other dependent family 
members
0.1202
other dependent family members 0.1268 for any other dependent 
family member
0.0721 for any other dependent 
family member
children with special needs 1st 0.4594 + additional 0.0920 for 
each subsequent child with special 
needs
same as for other children
Disability 0.9187 only for a taxpayer with 100% 
disability
0.0721 for any level of disability for a 
taxpayer and any other dependent 
family member
allowance for work while student 0.1718 Exempt up to 0.3333
income of self-employed journalists 
and artists
15% allowance for the first €25,000 
(1.3664 of aGaW) of income
none
voluntary supplementary pension 
insurance
maximum 0.1467 of aGaW or 5.84% 
of the individual gross wage 
(whichever is higher)
maximum 0.1682a
Life insurance premiums none maximum 0.1682
medical treatments none all costs (unlimited)
interest for housing loan none all costs (unlimited)
Pensions tax credit equal to 13.5% of the gross 
pension
Pensions are not taxed
Standardised costs (as a % of gross income)
contractual work, royalties, work while 
student
10% contractual work: 20%
Royalties: 30%
Rents From property: 40% From property: 30%
From property rented to tourists: 50%
PIT and SSC rates (in %)
Pit Up to 0.4173 of aGaW 16% 10%
0.4173−0.8346 of aGaW 27%
over 0.8346 of aGaW 41%
Employee ssc rate for the employed 
and self-employedb
22.1% 31%
Employer ssc rate for the employed 
and self-employed
16.1% 10.5%
Employee ssc rate applied to contrac-
tual work and royalties
none 4%
Employer ssc rate applied to contrac-
tual work and royalties
contractual work: 31% 6%
Royalties: none
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Disability is considered in both countries, with some differences. Slovenia provides an 
allowance only for 100% disability of a taxpayer. The FBH also entitles an allowance to those 
with a lower level of disability and for other disabled dependent family members. Students 
are eligible to claim a tax allowance up to a certain level of income from working while 
enrolled as a student in both systems. In 2011, both countries gave taxpayers the right to 
use a tax allowance for voluntary pension insurance. Afterwards, this provision and the 
provision that allowed for life insurance premiums were eliminated from the PIT Act in 
the FBH. The FBH also allows for medical treatments that are not covered by public health 
insurance and interest on housing loans. Slovenia permits a tax credit for pensions, whereas 
the FBH does not tax pensions at all.
2.2. Standardised costs
Taxpayers with income from contractual work, royalties, working while a student, and with 
income from rents may claim standardised costs that are deducted from gross income and 
reduce their tax base. Both systems permit such costs.
2.3. Tax schedule
Slovenia has a progressive schedule with marginal tax rates of 16, 27, and 41%, whereas the 
FBH has a single rate of 10%.
2.4. Social security contributions
Both countries have set the rate of SSC for income from employment (and self-employment) 
as a portion paid by the employer and a portion paid by the employee. In addition, there are 
also SSC to be paid for contractual work and royalties. The FBH applies both the employer 
and the employee part of SSC for royalties and contractual work, whereas Slovenia only 
applies the employer part to contractual work.
Table 3 summarises PIT and SSC parameters that are either excluded from our analysis 
or adjusted in order to achieve comparability between the two countries. We excluded those 
tax allowances that appear in one system only, while in the case of a dependent spouse we 
used ‘allowance for other dependent family members’ for both countries, as Slovenian data 
do not enable us to identify and separate spouses from other dependent family members. 
For the same reason, we applied a standardised cost of 30% in FBH for all rents deriving 
from property, even though rents from property renting to tourists are eligible for a 50% 
standardised cost. As already mentioned, there are three sources of income that are excluded 




The microsimulation model (scenario builder, microanalytic simulation) is used for sim-
ulating different scenarios in taxation, in our case the PIT and SSC. Development of the 
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concept of microsimulation modelling started in the 1950s (Michel & Lewis, 1990), and 
was introduced by Orcutt (1957) as a new type of socioeconomic modelling. Models are 
generally used to reflect the ‘real world’. Policy questions are associated with particular 
issues, such as revenue implications, redistributive effects, or transfer payments, and those 
questions should be answered through microsimulation models (Buddelmeyer, Creedy, & 
Kalb, 2007).
Slovenia and the FBH have national microsimulation models that have been developed 
outside the governmental institutions. However, those models have been used for govern-
ment purposes as well. Moreover, this is the first time that the FBHMOD (Microsimulation 
Model of the FBH) has been used in practice. In this article, we proceed with policy switch-
ing between the two countries, through an application of other country’s PIT and SSC 
parameters to local data (Slovenian parameters to FBH data and vice versa) using the 
national microsimulation models.
The data we use in our research are: (1) for Slovenia gathered from an administra-
tive database prepared by the Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia (Administrative 
Database for Slovenia) that includes a representative sample of 112,000 individuals (Majcen 
et al., 2012), and (2) for the FBH a taxpayer database of all taxpayers registered at the Tax 
Administration of the FBH and paying the PIT in 2009 (Taxpayers’ Database for the FBH) 
that includes around 500,000 taxpayers. As 2011 is the year of simulation (policy switching), 
data were uprated to 2011 values and models were calibrated to 2011 taxes. The analysis 
is performed at the level of an individual taxpayer, as the individual taxpayer is a unit of 
taxation in both countries.
Table 3. Pit and ssc parameters that are excluded from the analysis or adjusted.
source: Personal income tax act in the FBh; social security contributions act in the FBh; Personal income tax act in slove-
nia; social security contributions act in slovenia.
Provision Slovenia FBH
Allowance
Dependent spouse and other depend-
ent family members
Parameter applied for ‘other dependent family members’
children with special needs Excluded
Disability (own and dependent family 
members)
Excluded
allowance for work while a student Excluded
income of self-employed journalists 
and artists
Excluded
voluntary supplementary pension 
insurance
Excluded
Life insurance premiums Excluded
medical treatments Excluded
interest for housing loan Excluded
Standardised costs as a % of gross income
Rents From property rented to tourists: 30% 
instead of 50%
Excluded: income from capital, pensions, and income from contests and games of chance
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3.2. Inequality measures, progressivity measures, and decomposition of the 
redistributive effect
As already mentioned, we primarily use the Gini coefficient and concentration indices as 
measures of income inequality. The Gini coefficient of pre-tax income (GX) and the Gini 
coefficient of after-tax income (GN) are calculated, respectively, as:
 
 
where LX(p) is the pre-tax Lorenz curve, and L*(p) is the after-tax Lorenz curve.
In addition to the Gini Coefficient, which is a traditional measure of inequality, we also 
calculate the following concentration indices: a concentration index of after-tax income 
with respect to pre-tax income (DN), and a concentration index of taxes with respect to 
pre-tax income (DT) in the following way:
 
 
where LX–T(p) is the concentration curve of after-tax income with respect to pre-tax income, 
and LT(p) is the concentration curve of taxes with respect to pre-tax income.
Measuring income tax progressivity was first discussed by Musgrave and Thin (1948). 
They measured progressivity through the Gini coefficient of pre-tax and after-tax income. 
However, Kakwani (1977) criticised this measure for not being a measure of progressivity, 
but of the redistributive effect, which is a function of the average tax rate. Mathematically, 
the standard measure of the redistributive effect (RE) can be written as:
 
Reynolds and Smolensky (1977) wrote RE in a similar fashion as in expression (5), but 
instead of the Gini coefficient of after-tax income, GN, they used the concentration coef-
ficient of after-tax income, DN. Thus we obtain the Reynolds-Smolensky redistributive 
effect, RERS:
 
Kakwani (1977) then introduced a new measure of progressivity that is equal to:
 
where DT is the concentration coefficient of taxes. Later, Kakwani (1984, 1986) presented 
the decomposition of the redistributive effect3 by covering horizontal and vertical equity:
 







































(8)R = H + V
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with t being an average tax rate calculated as Q / m, where Q is total tax revenue, and m is 
total pre-tax income.
Moreover, Atkinson (1980) and Plotnick (1981) measured the income unit re-ranking, 




Finally, the decomposition of the redistributive effect is based on the Kakwani vertical 
or progressivity effect (VK) and the Atkinson-Plotnick index of horizontal inequity or 
re-ranking effect (RAP):
 
meaning that the re-ranking decreases the redistributive effect. VK is calculated as:
 
As the Atkinson-Plotnick-Kakwani decomposition misses the horizontal inequity per 
se in its structure, Aronson, Johnson, and Lambert (1994) captured all three: vertical 
effect, horizontal effect, and re-ranking, with the following decomposition (AJL stands for 
Aronson-Johnson-Lambert):
 
where VAJL is derived from the Kakwani vertical or progressivity effect, HAJL is based on 
the after-tax inequality, and RAJL is the same as RAP.
This kind of methodology requires equal pre-tax income of individuals. Usually, it is not 
feasible in the real world to have completely equal income among the taxpayers. Therefore, 
close equals should be grouped, which gives rise to re-ranking. Within-group re-ranking 
and entire-group re-ranking are not covered here, as such methodology fails regarding the 
decomposition of the redistributive effects (Čok, Urban, & Verbič, 2013; Urban & Lambert, 
2008).
Urban and Lambert (2008) proposed capturing all three effects (vertical, horizontal, and 
re-ranking), taking into account all forms of re-ranking (within group RWG, entire group 
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where:
 
From equations (16) and (17) we then obtain the following expression for VAJL:
 






Since V – H = RE + RAP, it follows from equation (13) that:
 
Our article is based on the Atkinson-Plotnick-Kakwani decomposition (even though we also 
presented other decompositions of the redistributive effect). We do so to enable comparison 
with the results for other countries. Namely, even though being the most comprehensive, 
the Urban-Lambert decomposition was introduced only recently.
4. Key findings
In Table 4, we compare the aggregated amounts of pre-tax income subject to tax, taxes, 
and after-tax income in both countries. In addition, Table 5 reveals the average after-tax 
income by decile groups, while Table 6 highlights the inequality measures, progressivity 
measures, and the redistributive effect of taxes. In all cases, we also present the findings of 
policy switching between Slovenia and the FBH.
Table 4 shows the pre-tax income, employer (SSCER) and employee (SSCEE) social secu-
rity contributions, and PIT and after-tax income for both countries. All data are expressed in 
units of the AGAW. The last two columns of the table include policy shifting results, showing 
what would happen if Slovenia (FBH) applied the FBH (Slovenian) parameters. Applying 
(17)RAP = RWG + REG + RAJL
(18)VAJL = V−REG
(19)HAJL = H + RWG
(20)V = VAJL + REG
(21)H = HAJL−RWG
(22)VK = V−H
Table 4. Pre-tax income, taxes, and after-tax income (in units of the aGaW).
notes: sLo = slovenian data and slovenian parameters; FBh = FBh data and FBh parameters; FBh – sLo = FBh parameters 
and slovenian data; sLo – FBh = slovenian parameters and FBh data; Pre-tax income = Gross income subject to tax + ss-
cER; sscER = Employer ssc; sscEE = Employee ssc; totssc = sscER + sscEE; Pit = Personal income tax; tottaX = ss-
cER + sscEE + Pit; after-tax income = Pre-tax income – sscER – sscEE – Pit.
source: taxpayers’ Database for the FBh and administrative Database for slovenia; authors’ calculations.
Category Slo FBH FBH – Slo Slo – FBH
Pre-tax income 997,538 432,228 997,538 432,228
sscER 125,703 39,268 78,752 59,467
sscEE 163,338 114,413 241,495 76,982
totssc 289,041 153,681 320,247 136,449
Pit 108,141 14,408 38,311 45,271
tottaX 397,182 168,089 358,558 181,720
after-tax income 600,356 264,139 638,980 250,508
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Table 5. average after-tax income by decile groups (in units of the aGaW).
notes: sLo = slovenian data and slovenian parameters; FBh = FBh data and FBh parameters; FBh – sLo = FBh parameters 
and slovenian data; sLo – FBh = slovenian parameters and FBh data.
source: taxpayers’ Database for the FBh and administrative Database for slovenia; authors’ calculations.
Decile Groups Slo FBH FBH – Slo Slo – FBH
i 0.0141 0.0357 0.0143 0.0339
ii 0.1042 0.1343 0.1053 0.1356
iii 0.2724 0.2437 0.2685 0.2539
iv 0.3889 0.3171 0.3680 0.3363
v 0.4562 0.3635 0.4452 0.3884
vi 0.5247 0.4355 0.5254 0.4543
vii 0.6110 0.5619 0.6170 0.5494
viii 0.7239 0.6948 0.7417 0.6568
iX 0.8959 0.8799 0.9415 0.8238
X 1.5011 1.7220 1.7740 1.4708
total 0.5492 0.5388 0.5801 0.5104
Table 6. inequality measures, progressivity measures, and the redistributive effect.
notes: sLo = slovenian data and slovenian parameters; FBh = FBh data and FBh parameters; FBh – sLo = FBh parameters 
and slovenian data; sLo – FBh = slovenian parameters and FBh data; GX = Gini coefficient of pre-tax income; GN = Gini 
coefficient of after-tax income; RE (redistributive effect) = GX − GN; RE / GX = share of RE in GX; DN = concentration 
coefficient of after-tax income; DT = concentration coefficient of taxes; P = kakwani index of progressivity; t = average 
tax rate; VK = vertical effect; RAP = re-ranking effect; VK (% RE) = v as percentage share in RE; RAP (% RE) = RAP as per-
centage share in RE.
scenario 1: Pre-tax income = Gross income subject to tax + sscER (employer ssc); taxes = sscER (employer ssc) + sscEE 
(employee ssc) + Pit; after tax income = Pre-tax income – sscER – sscEE – Pit.
scenario 2: Pre-tax income = Gross income subject to tax – sscEE (employee ssc); taxes = Pit; after tax income = Pre-tax 
income – Pit.
source: taxpayers’ Database for the FBh and administrative Database for slovenia; authors’ calculations.
Slo FBH FBH – Slo Slo – FBH
% RE % RE % RE % RE
scenario 1
GX 0.4652 0.4579 0.4652 0.4579
GN 0.4102 0.4478 0.4442 0.4121
RE 0.0550 0.0101 0.0210 0.0458
RE / GX 0.1183 0.0221 0.0451 0.0100
DN 0.4075 0.4460 0.4409 0.4097
DT 0.5524 0.4768 0.5086 0.5245
P 0.0872 0.0188 0.0434 0.0666
t 0.3982 0.3881 0.3594 0.4204
VK 0.0577 104.92 0.0199 117.98 0.0243 116.12 0.0483 105.42
RAP 0.0027 4.92 0.0018 17.98 0.0034 16.12 0.0025 5.42
scenario 2
GX 0.4539 0.4574 0.4531 0.4569
GN 0.4102 0.4478 0.4442 0.4121
RE 0.0437 0.0096 0.0089 0.0447
RE/GX 0.0962 0.0210 0.0197 0.0979
DN 0.4095 0.4476 0.4441 0.4096
DT 0.7001 0.6373 0.6040 0.7186
P 0.2462 0.1799 0.1509 0.2617
t 0.1526 0.0517 0.0566 0.1530
VK 0.0443 101.57 0.0098 102.10 0.0090 101.50 0.0473 105.76
RAP 0.0007 1.57 0.0002 2.10 0.0001 1.50 0.0026 5.76
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the FBH parameters, Slovenia would experience a decrease in SSCER and PIT, while SSCEE 
would increase. The FBH flat rate of 10% would decrease Slovenian PIT revenues by 64.65% 
(from 108,141 units of the AGAW to 38,311 units of the AGAW). Consequently, the total 
taxes would decrease by 9.72%, contributing to a growth of after-tax income by 6.43%. 
Applying the Slovenian parameters to FBH data, the overall collection of SSC would decrease 
by 11.21%, while progressive rates of Slovenian PIT would increase the FBH PIT revenue 
by 3.14 times. Total taxes would increase by 8.11%, reducing the after-tax income by 5.16%.
Table 5 shows the distribution of the average after-tax income by decile groups for both 
countries. All data are expressed in units of the AGAW. The last two columns of the table 
again include policy shifting results. All Slovenian decile groups, except the third, fourth, 
and fifth, would experience an increase in after-tax income, if the FBH tax system would 
be applied. The reason is a combination of FBH allowances and its flat 10% PIT rate, which 
substantially reduces the effective tax rates for most Slovenian taxpayers from the sample. 
Consequently, the major increase of 18.18% in the after-tax income would be experienced 
by those in the tenth decile group. On the other hand, if Slovenian tax parameters were 
applied to the FBH data, five decile groups (the first and top four) would experience a 
decrease in the after-tax income. However, the largest decrease in the after-tax income (of 
14.59%) would be experienced by those in the tenth decile group.
Table 6 represents inequality measures, progressivity measures, and the redistributive 
effect of taxes in both countries. The last two columns of the table again include policy 
shifting results. In Scenario 1, we take into account the overall effect of both PIT and SSC, 
while in Scenario 2 we only take into account the effect of PIT.
The results show that the inequality of pre-tax income in Scenario 1, measured through 
the Gini coefficient, is 1.59% higher in Slovenia (0.4652) than in the FBH (0.4579). Slovenia 
also experiences a higher redistributive effect of taxes than the FBH, which is revealed 
through the reduction of the Gini coefficient (after taxes) by 11.82%, whereas in the FBH 
the Gini coefficient is reduced by 2.21%. The concentration coefficient of after-tax income 
is 9.45% higher in the FBH (0.4460) than in Slovenia (0.4075). The concentration coeffi-
cient of taxes is 15.86% higher in Slovenia (0.5524) than in the FBH (0.4768). The Kakwani 
index of progressivity is substantially higher in Slovenia (0.0872) than in the FBH (0.0188), 
indicating extremely high tax progressivity in Slovenia.
Similar results are revealed in Scenario 2, which takes into account PIT only. Since the 
Slovenian PIT includes a progressive tax schedule, while the FBH uses a flat PIT regime, it 
is not a surprise that the Slovenian PIT system exhibits a higher redistributive effect overall. 
However, redistributive losses, which are a consequence of different treatment of taxpayers 
through the PIT acts, are relatively low in both Slovenia and the FBH (1.57% of the RE 
and 2.10% of the RE, respectively). On the other hand, Scenario 1 exhibits much higher 
redistributive losses, especially in the FBH (17.98% of the RE), as Scenario 1 also includes 
social security contributions next to the PIT, and social security contributions are paid only 
by some taxpayers4 (Stanovnik & Verbič, 2005, 2013).
In the case of policy switching in Scenario 1, when Slovenia applies the FBH parameters, 
the Gini coefficient of after-tax income increases by 8.29%, implying higher income inequal-
ity. In the FBH, the Gini coefficient of after-tax income initially amounts to 0.4478. If the 
FBH applies Slovenian parameters, the Gini coefficient of after-tax income becomes equal 
to 0.4121, resulting in a 7.97% decrease. In other words, applying the Slovenian parameters 
results in the FBH experiencing less inequality of after-tax income.
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The concentration coefficient of after-tax income decreases by 8.14% (from 0.4460 to 
0.4097) and the concentration coefficient of taxes increases by 10.00% (from 0.4768 to 
0.5245), if the Slovenian parameters are applied to the FBH data. Looking at the decompo-
sition of the redistributive effect, we observe that applying the FBH parameters to Slovenian 
data results in the redistributive effect decreasing by 61.82% (from 0.055 to 0.021), and 
increasing by 4.53 times (from 0.0101 to 0.0458) when the FBH data and Slovenian param-
eters are used.
The Kakwani index of progressivity decreases by 50.23% (from 0.0872 to 0.0434) in 
Scenario 1, when the FBH parameters are applied to Slovenian data, and increases by 3.54 
times (from 0.0188 to 0.0666), when the FBH data and Slovenian parameters are used. The 
increase in income inequality in Slovenia (decrease in the FBH) when switching to the FBH 
(Slovenian) system is caused by a decrease (increase) in the average tax rates, since Slovenia 
experiences much higher tax progressivity. The loss of redistribution increases from 4.92% of 
the RE to 16.12% of the RE in Slovenia when applying the FBH parameters (and decreases 
from 17.98% of the RE to 5.42% of the RE when the FBH data and Slovenian parameters 
are used), implying higher losses of redistribution in the FBH tax system.
The results of policy switching in Scenario 2 are in line with the results of Scenario 1, 
revealing that an application of the FBH parameters of a flat PIT system to Slovenian data 
slightly reduces the loss of redistribution (from 1.57% of the RE to 1.50% of the RE), com-
pared with the current Slovenian PIT system. And vice versa, the application of the progres-
sive Slovenian PIT system to the FBH data reveals an increase in the loss of redistribution.
5. Conclusion
This article examined the impact of policy switching between Slovenia and the FBH on 
revenue collection, after-tax income, inequality measures, progressivity measures, and the 
redistributive effect. The key findings showed that by applying the FBH parameters, Slovenia 
would lose 9.72% of total taxes (PIT and SSC), whereas the after-tax income would increase 
by 6.43%. The FBH would experience a converse process; the total taxes would increase by 
8.11%, reducing the after-tax income by 5.16%.
Investigation of the impact of policy switching on the average after-tax income by decile 
groups revealed that in Slovenia the taxpayers would be better off in seven decile groups, 
whereas in the FBH the taxpayers would be better off in the bottom five decile groups, 
while the others would experience a reduction of after-tax income. However, the major 
difference in after-tax income would be experienced by those in the tenth decile group in 
both countries. Inequality of after-tax income would increase in Slovenia, whereas it would 
decrease in the FBH. Put into figures, the Gini coefficient of after-tax income would increase 
by 8.29% in Slovenia, whereas in the FBH it would decrease by 7.97%. In terms of the loss 
of redistribution, the FBH would exhibit a higher loss than Slovenia.
The research has its limitations. The major limitation is the exclusion of certain tax allow-
ances and sources of income that are not taxed in both systems. This particularly refers to 
pensions, which represent a major income source for an important part of the population 
in both countries. Last but not least, differences between countries are sufficient to expect 
that people in each country would react (change their behaviour) if the tax system of the 
other country is applied. Nevertheless, our results highlight the consequences of a rather 
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divergent development of two tax systems, and show how countries with once common 
background can become different in a relatively short period of time.
Notes
1.  Bosnia and Herzegovina consists of two entities (the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and the Republic of Srpska) and the Brčko District. Each entity and the district have their 
own PIT acts and its own tax administration for direct taxes. However, we use the term 
‘country’ for the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBH) throughout this article for 
practical purposes.
2.  We express values in terms of average gross wage to enable comparison. We consider this 
approach more suitable than expressing values in absolute terms in national currencies (EUR 
and Bosnian Convertible Marks) due to huge differences in income. Namely, the average gross 
annual wage in 2011 was €18,295.67 in Slovenia (Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia, 
2015) and €7,659.38 in the FBH (Institute for Statistics of the FBH, 2012).
3.  The redistributive effect was stated earlier through the Gini coefficient; see equation (5).
4.  In particular, by those who earn income from employment, self-employment, and contractual 
work in both Slovenia and the FBH, and by those who earn income from royalties in the FBH.
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